The Epistemology of Disagreement: Why Not Bayesianism?

Disagreement is a ubiquitous feature of human life, and philosophers have dutifully attended to it. One important question related to disagreement is epistemological: How does a rational person change her beliefs (if at all) in light of disagreement from others? The typical methodology for answering this question is to endorse a steadfast or conciliatory disagreement norm (and not both) on a priori grounds and selected intuitive cases. In this paper, I argue that this methodology is misguided. Instead, a thoroughgoingly Bayesian strategy is what's needed. Such a strategy provides conciliatory norms in appropriate cases and steadfast norms in appropriate cases. I argue, further, that the few extant efforts to address disagreement in the Bayesian spirit are laudable but uncompelling. A modelling, rather than a functional, approach gets us the right norms and is highly general, allowing the epistemologist to deal with (1) multiple epistemic interlocutors, (2) epistemic superiors and inferiors (i.e. not just epistemic peers), and (3) dependence between interlocutors

Plural Voting for the Twenty-First Century

Recent political developments cast doubt on the wisdom of democratic decision-making. Brexit, the Colombian people's (initial) rejection of peace with the FARC, and the election of Donald Trump suggest that the time is right to explore alternatives to democracy. In this essay, I describe and defend the epistocratic system of government which is, given current theoretical and empirical knowledge, most likely to produce optimal political outcomes—or at least better outcomes than democracy produces. To wit, we should expand the suffrage as wide as possible and weight citizens’ votes in accordance with their competence. As it turns out, the optimal system is closely related to J. S. Mill's plural voting proposal. I also explain how voters’ competences can be precisely determined, without reference to an objective standard of correctness and without generating invidious comparisons between voters

What's Wrong with Libertarianism: A Meritocratic Diagnosis

Some people may think that libertarianism and meritocracy have much in common; that the libertarian's ideal world looks like the meritocrat's ideal world; and that the public policies guiding us to each are one and the same. This is wrong in all respects. In this essay I explain why. After providing an overview of meritocratic justice, I argue that meritocracy is a more compelling theory of distributive justice than libertarianism. Meritocracy better protects the core value of personal responsibility; incorporates efficiency-enhancing regulation which libertarianism cannot; provides more positive liberty; and solves salient, real-world debates about distributive justice

Why not be a desertist?: Three arguments for desert and against luck egalitarianism

Many philosophers believe that luck egalitarianism captures “desert-like” intuitions about justice. Some even think that luck egalitariansm distributes goods in accordance with desert. In this paper, we argue that this is wrong. Desertism conflicts with luck egalitarianism in three important contexts, and, in these contexts, desertism renders the proper moral judgment. First, compared to desertism, luck egalitarianism is sometimes too stingy: it fails to justly compensate people for their socially valuable contributions—when those contributions arose from “option luck”. Second, luck egalitarianism is sometimes too restrictive: it fails to justly compensate people who make a social contribution when that contribution arose from “brute luck”. Third, luck egalitarianism is too limited in scope: it cannot diagnose economic injustice arising independently of comparative levels of justice. The lesson of this paper is that luck egalitarians should consider supplementing their theory with desert considerations. Or, even better, consider desertism as a superior alternative to their theory

On the Compatibility of Epistocracy and Public Reason

In "epistocratic" forms of government, political power is wielded by those who possess the knowledge relevant to good policymaking. Some democrats--notably, David Estlund--concede that epistocracy might produce better political outcomes than democracy but argue that epistocracy cannot be justified under public reason. These objections to epistocracy are unsound because they violate a viability constraint: they are also fatal to democracy and all other plausible political arrangements. Moreover, there is a problem with the public reason framework itself--a problem that can only be solved by providing a better definition for what makes an objection to a political arrangement a "reasonable" one

On Harry Frankfurt’s “Equality as a Moral Ideal”

A retrospective essay, written for the 125th anniversary of Ethics

Justice and the Meritocratic State

Like American politics, the academic debate over justice is polarized, with almost all theories of justice falling within one of two traditions: egalitarianism and libertarianism. This book provides an alternative to the partisan standoff by focusing not on equality or liberty, but on the idea that we should give people the things that they deserve.　 Mulligan sets forth a theory of economic justice—meritocracy—which rests upon a desert principle and is distinctive from existing work in two ways. First, meritocracy is grounded in empirical research on how human beings think, intuitively, about justice. Research in social psychology and experimental economics reveals that people simply don’t think that social goods should be distributed equally, nor do they dismiss the idea of social justice. Across ideological and cultural lines, people believe that rewards should reflect merit. Second, the book discusses hot-button political issues and makes concrete policy recommendations. These issues include anti-meritocratic bias against women and racial minorities and the United States’ widening economic inequality. Justice and the Meritocratic State offers a new theory of justice and provides solutions to our most vexing social and economic problems. It will be of keen interest to philosophers, economists, and political theorists

Testosterone replacement therapy for older men

Despite intensive research on testosterone therapy for older men, important questions remain unanswered. The evidence clearly indicates that many older men display a partial androgen deficiency. In older men, low circulating testosterone is correlated with low muscle strength, with high adiposity, with insulin resistance and with poor cognitive performance. Testosterone replacement in older men has produced benefits, but not consistently so. The inconsistency may arise from differences in the dose and duration of testosterone treatment, as well as selection of the target population. Generally, studies reporting anabolic responses to testosterone have employed higher doses of testosterone for longer treatment periods and have targeted older men whose baseline circulating bioavailable testosterone levels were low. Most studies of testosterone replacement have reported anabolic that are modest compared to what can be achieved with resistance exercise training. However, several strategies currently under evaluation have the potential to produce greater anabolic effects and to do so in a safe manner. At this time, testosterone therapy can not be recommended for the general population of older men. Older men who are hypogonadal are at greater risk for the catabolic effects associated with a number of acute and chronic medical conditions. Future research is likely to reveal benefits of testosterone therapy for some of these special populations. Testosterone therapy produces a number of adverse effects, including worsening of sleep apnea, gynecomastia, polycythemia and elevation of PSA. Efficacy and adverse effects should be assessed frequently throughout the course of therapy

Engaging Students Engaging Industry Engaging Enterprise

A reflective piece on how a small team of students and academics gained more awareness of their own sense of enterprise and creativity. The case study examines the phases and crisis points of the whole event process and identifies some of the key learning outcomes for all involved

Conservation of structure and mechanism in primary and secondary transporters exemplified by SiaP, a sialic acid binding virulence factor from Haemophilus influenzae

Extracytoplasmic solute receptors (ESRs) are important components of solute uptake systems in bacteria, having been studied extensively as parts of ATP binding cassette transporters. Herein we report the first crystal structure of an ESR protein from a functionally characterized electrochemical ion gradient-dependent secondary transporter. This protein, SiaP, forms part of a tripartite ATP-independent periplasmic transporter specific for sialic acid in Haemophilus influenzae. Surprisingly, the structure reveals an overall topology similar to ATP binding cassette ESR proteins, which is not apparent from the sequence, demonstrating that primary and secondary transporters can share a common structural component. The structure of SiaP in the presence of the sialic acid analogue 2,3-didehydro-2-deoxyN-acetylneuraminic acid reveals the ligand bound in a deep cavity with its carboxylate group forming a salt bridge with a highly conserved Arg residue. Sialic acid binding, which obeys simple bimolecular association kinetics as determined by stopped-flow fluorescence spectroscopy, is accompanied by domain closure about a hinge region and the kinking of an alpha-helix hinge component. The structure provides insight into the evolution, mechanism, and substrate specificity of ESR-dependent secondary transporters that are widespread in prokaryotes